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INTRODUCTION

Increasing rates of divorce and remarriage have led to a growing
number of stepparents' in this country.2 Statistics gathered from the
1990 Census showed that approximately five and one-half million
married couple households included at least one minor stepchild.'
Demographers predict that as many as one in three American children4
can expect to spend some of his or her childhood years in a stepfamily.
Psychological and sociological studies indicate that many stepparents
and stepchildren form close, enduring relationships with each other.' The

1. The dictionary defines a "stepparent" as "[t]he mother or father of a child born during a
previous marriage of the other parent and.., not the natural parent of such child." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1268 (5th ed. 1979). However, the increase of illegitimate births in this country
necessitates a broader definition in which a stepparent is "[t]he spouse of a parent of a child not his
or her offspring." Janet Mary Riley, Stepparents' Responsibility of Support, 44 LA. L. REV. 1753,
1753 (1984).
2. Approximately half of all marriages end in divorce. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. P23-180, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990's,

at I (Oct. 1992) [hereinafter CENSUS]. "Currently, more than 4 out of 10 marriages in the United
States involve a second or higher-order marriage for the bride, the groom, or both." Id. at 5 (citation
onitted).
3. See id. at 2, 10 tbl.L; see also Margaret M. Mahoney, A Legal Definitionof the Stepfamily:
The Example of Incest Regulation, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 21, 21 (1993).
4. See Paul C. Glick, RemarriedFamilies, Stepfamilies, and Stepchildren: A Brief Demographic Profile, 38 FAM. REL. 24, 26 (1989). For a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the
steprelationship, see generally PATRICIA L. PAPERNOV, BECOMING A STEPFAMILY (1993).

5. See David R. Fine & Mark A. Fine, Learning from Social Sciences: A Model for
Reformation ofthe Laws Affecting Stepfamilies, 97 DICK. L. REV. 49, 64 (1992); see also Lawrence
H. Ganong & Marilyn M. Coleman, Stepchildren's Perceptionsof Their Parents, 148 J. GENETIC
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increasing rate of remarriage 6 makes it probable that this trend will
continue. This increase in stepfamilies also brings the possibility of
increased stepfamily dissolutions through divorce.7 A stepparent, in an
effort to maintain an existing relationship with his or her stepchild, may
seek custody of the child within the dissolution proceeding. However,
many courts deny these stepparents the standing needed to pursue their

custody claims.8 Courts often hold that the jurisdiction statute governing
the divorce proceeding does not give them the power to address the issue
of custody when someone other than the biological or legal parent is
bringing suit for custody.9 The courts' rationale stems from a fear that
the biological or legal parent's rights will not be sufficiently protected if
the stepparent is allowed to use the dissolution proceeding as a forum to
claim custody of the child.10 This denial of standing, however, operates
as an improper absolute preference for biological or legal parents and

PSYCHOL. 5, 13, 15 (1987) (concluding that most children in stepfamilies enjoy at least moderately
close relationships with their stepparents); Charles Hobart, Parent-ChildRelations in Remarried
Families, 8 J. FAM. ISSUES 259, 275 (1987) (finding that some stepparent-child relationships have
helped to create happier, more loving homes, and have helped to increase spousal communication
between the natural parent and stepparent).
In many stepfamilies the stepparent assumes the role of what some commentators call "the
psychological parent." The psychological parent develops a parent-child relationship with the child
through day-to-day interaction, companionship, and emotional caring for the child. This relationship
fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, in addition to providing for the child's physical
necessities of daily living. Once this bond forms, many psychologists believe that breaking up the
relationship would have serious and harmful effects on the child's emotional development. See
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17-20 (1979) [hereinafter
BEST INTERESTS]. In Doe v. Doe, 399 N.Y.S.2d 977, 982 (Sup. Ct. 1977), a New York court
presiding over a dissolution proceeding found that the stepmother had become the psychological
parent of her stepchildren and used this finding as part of its best interest analysis in holding that
the stepmother should have sole custody of the husband's children after the divorce. For a general
discussion of the psychological parent theory in a different context, see J. Hammond Muench &
Martin R. Levy, PsychologicalParentage:A NaturalRight, 13 FAM. L.Q. 129 (1979) (arguing that
in custody battles between foster parents and biological or legal parents, custody of the child should
go to whomever the child's psychological parent is, even if the psychological parent is the foster
parent).
6. See CENSUS, supra note 2, at 5.
7. See id. at 6 tbl.D.
8. See infra notes 119-69 and accompanying text.
9. This Note focuses on stepparents' rights to custody only within dissolution proceedings.
Most states use different standards depending on the type of proceeding with which the court is
faced. For example, in Olvera v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 925, 926 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991), the court
recognized that Arizona law contained different child custody provisions, one in the domestic
relations law and one in the juvenile code.
10. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child
Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. Rv. 38, 72-73 (1984).
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fails to take into account the best interests of the children involved in the
divorce.
This Note argues that stepparents who can show they are in loco
parentis" with their stepchild should have standing to sue for custody
of that child within the dissolution proceeding. Part II of this Note
examines the development of stepparents' rights and duties within the
stepparent-child relationship. Part I begins by discussing, in depth, the
doctrine of in loco parentisand how the finding of in loco parentis status
between a stepparent and child can affect the steprelationship. It
concludes by proposing a test for courts to apply to determine whether
the in loco parentisstatus exists, which will ensure uniformity in in loco
parentis determinations. Part IV reviews how various courts have
analyzed the stepparent standing issue. Part V concludes that those
stepparents who can show an in loco parentis relationship with their
stepchildren should have the opportunity to be heard on the issue of
custody by courts in a dissolution proceeding.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF STEPPARENTS' RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Historically, any rights or obligations stepparents had to their
stepchildren were coexistive with the marriage to the biological or legal
parent, thus ending upon termination of the marriage through divorce or
death. 2 Lawmakers regarded the stepparent-child relationship as
derivative, existing only because both parties were related to the
biological or legal parent. 3 Once the marriage ended, the common link
and neither party
shared by the stepparent and the child disappeared
4
thereafter owed any obligations to the other.'
Despite the ever increasing number of stepfamilies in this count5 courts and legislatures have been reluctant to stray from the
try,
traditional belief about stepfamily relationships.' 6 For example, most

11. In loco parentis is the Latin term for "[i]n the place of a parent." BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY, supra note I, at 708. For a more in-depth discussion of the in loco parentis doctrine,
see infra Part Ill.
12. See Janet Leach Richards, Redefining Parenthood.ParentalRights Versus Child Rights,

40 WAYNE L. REV. 1227, 1244-45 (1994).
13. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 52-53. For an example of this idea at work, see UTAH

CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (1992).
14. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 52-53.
15. See CENSUS, supra note 2, at 5.

16. See Fine & Fine, supra note 5, at 49-50; Mahoney, supra note 10, at 39-40; see also
Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (observing that the legal
severance of the stepparent-biological parent relationship also severed any legal relationship the
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states do not impose any statutory requirements on stepparents to support
their stepchildren during the marriage.17 Even if stepparents are
obligated, the responsibility terminates when the stepfamily dissolves. 8

In contrast, as a general rule, biological or legal parents' support
obligations continue at least until the children reach the age of majority,

whether or not the marriage between the biological or legal parents
remains intact. 9 In the absence of legislation, the trend of judicial

precedent suggests that courts will continue to sparingly impose child
support obligations on stepparents during, or after, marriage."
Courts have been more progressive toward stepparents' rights in the

area of visitation after termination of the marriage than in any other area
of stepfamily law.2 Several states have explicit statutory authority
granting courts the power to provide stepparents with visitation rights.22
Other states have "third party" visitation statutes,23 which some courts
have used as a basis for granting stepparents visitation privileges.24

stepparent had with the stepchild).
17. A recent survey found that only five states impose statutory support obligations on
stepparents. See Richard S. Victor et al., Statutory Review of Third-PartyRights RegardingCustody,
Visitation, and Support, 25 FAM. L.Q. 19, 54-55 tbl.lI (1991) [hereinafter Statutory Review].
18. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 52. Despite this general rule, in limited circumstances,
some courts have required continuing stepparent support after termination of the marriage. See
Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 714-18 (Ct. App. 1961) (holding stepparent liable for
post-marital support of the child based on the theory of equitable estoppel); L. v. L., 497 S.W.2d 840
(Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (imposing post-divorce support obligation on stepfather upon finding he had
married the mother while she was pregnant with the child, knew it was not his child, and expressly
agreed to care for her child); Burse v. Burse, 356 N.E.2d 755 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (imposing postdivorce support obligation on the stepfather since he had married the mother while she was pregnant
with another man's child, which under state law terminated the mother's right to sue the biological
father for support).
19. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 25-26.
20. See Fine & Fine, supra note 5, at 51; see also R. Michael Redman, The Support of
Children in Blended Families:A Callfor Change, 25 FAM. L.Q. 83, 86 (1991).
21. See Fine & Fine, supra note 5, at 56.
22. See CAL. FAm. CODE § 3101 (XVest 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b) (Supp. 1996);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303 (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie 1995); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 767.245 (West 1993).
23. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59
(West 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(7) (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (West Supp.
1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West
1992 & Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05.1(B)(1)(c) (Anderson Supp. 1995); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
24. See Hutton v. Hutton, 486 N.E.2d 129, 130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the relevant
statute which provided visitation privileges to any "person having an interest in the welfare of the
child" allowed the court to consider the visitation rights of a stepfather with his ex-wife's daughter);
see also Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.022 did not preclude the court from granting visitation rights to a former
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Either type of statute gives courts the power to grant visitation to
' of the child.26
stepparents if it is in the "best interest" 25
Even in the absence of legislation, some courts have used a "best
interest of the child" analysis to grant visitation privileges to stepparents.
For example, in Shoemaker v. Shoemaker,27 an Alabama appeals court
held that courts can make stepparent visitation orders "only after the best
interests and welfare [of the child] are raised and shown to be advanced
by such visitation. , 28 The Alabama Code did not contain third-party or
stepparent visitation statutes.2 9 In Honaker v. Burnside," a West
Virginia court applied a best interest of the child standard and granted
visitation rights to the child's stepfather and half brother, 31 even though
West Virginia law had not been interpreted to grant stepparents or other
third parties visitation privileges.32
Although stepparent visitation law has made some progress, the law
dealing with stepparent custody rights remains problematic. 3 3 Historical-

stepfather who had stood in loco parentis to his former stepson during the marriage).
25. "Best interest" of the child is an ambiguous standard, which gives courts discretion in their
decisionmaking when applied. See Gerber v. Gerber, 407 N.W.2d 497, 502 (Neb. 1987) (holding that
a best interest analysis was to include an analysis of many factors and circumstances such as: the
age and health of the child; the character of the non-custodial parent; the place where visitation
rights will be exercised; the frequency and duration of visits; the emotional relationship between the
visiting parent and the child; the likely effect of visitation on the child; the availability of the child
for visitation; the likelihood of disrupting an established lifestyle otherwise beneficial to the child;
and, when appropriate, the wishes of the child).
26. See supra notes 22-23. Some state statutes expressly require courts to do a best interest
analysis before granting visitation. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05.1 (B)(1)(c) (granting
courts the power to confer visitation privileges on a "person other than a parent" if, among other
things, "[tihe court determines that the granting of... visitation rights is in the best interest of the
child"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303(a) (requiring "a finding that such visitation rights would be
in the best interests of the minor child" before visitation can be granted); see also Susan M.
Silverman, Note, Stepparent Visitation Rights: Toward the Best Interests of the Child, 30 J. FAM.
L. 943, 951 (1991-92).
27. 563 So. 2d 1032 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
28. Id. at 1034. The court also noted that it would be the rare case where the best interest of
the child would be advanced by granting visitation privileges to the stepparent. See id.
29. See id. The Alabama Code provides grandparents with the legal privilege of visitation but
does not provide stepparents or other third parties with that same privilege. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-4
(Supp. 1995).
30. 388 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 1989).
31. See id. at 326.
32. The court did not refer to any controlling statute in its visitation analysis. See id. However,
W. VA. CODE § 48-2(B)-5 to -6 (1995) does provide visitation privileges to grandparents.
33. This Part of the Note provides a brief overview of the development of stepparents' rights
in the area of custody with respect to the substantive law applied in custody battles between
stepparents and biological or legal parents. It should not be confused with the issue of standing, the
focus of this Note. Standing is viewed as a procedural and jurisdictional problem since the lack
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ly, the law viewed children as the property of their fathers, making a
father's custody right equivalent to a property right.34 Change came in

the early twentieth century as courts shifted their emphasis in custody
disputes away from a father's property right in his child to a natural right
of custody based on the parent's biological or legal ties to the child.35
Courts began to presume that biological or legal parents were best fit to
fulfill the child's needs due to their biological or legal relationship with
the child.36 This trend has developed into the judicial doctrine now
called "the parental preference" standard.37 The majority of states apply

some form of this standard in custody disputes between biological or
legal parents and third parties.38

Application of the parental preference standard requires that courts
award custody to the biological or legal parent unless the party bringing
suit can prove the parent is unfit or, as some jurisdictions state, that

"extraordinary circumstances"'40 exist which justify granting custody to
the third party. The burden of proof is often very stringent, and rarely
satisfied by stepparents or other third parties.4" Only after a third party

thereof prevents courts from applying the substantive law to the case before them.
34. See SANFORD N. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 4 (1971). "During the feudal period,
custodial rights, which had commercial value, were subject to transfer and sale; a child was primarily
a financial asset to his father. During this early period, therefore, a custodial right was essentially
a property right." Id.
35. See Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parentsv. Third Parties: Whose Right to Child
Custody Is ConstitutionallyProtected?, 20 GA. L. REv. 705, 706-07 (1986).
36. See KATZ, supra note 34, at 4.
37. See id.
38. A recent survey indicated that 38 states employ custodial presumptions in favor of
biological parents. See Fine & Fine, supra note 5, at 56; see also Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d
38, 40 n.2 (Utah 1982). For a more in-depth and detailed analysis of the parental preference
standard, see Haynie, supra note 35, at 708-21.
39. See, e.g., Schuh v. Roberson, 788 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Ark. 1990) (holding that "[w]here a
third party intervenes in a child custody matter, that party has the burden of proving the parents are
incompetent or unfit to have custody").
Unfitness can be proven by several factors. Courts have found biological parents unfit based
on violence, criminal activity, neglect, and abandonment. See 3 CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
MANUAL § 11.04[1-4] (1995).
40. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277,282 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that courts cannot intervene
in the biological parent's right to custody unless there is first a judicial finding of "surrender,
abandonment, unfitness, persisting neglect or other extraordinary circumstance[s]" which would
drastically affect the welfare of the child).
41. See, e.g., Larson v. Larson, 384 S.E.2d 193, 194 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that a
nonparent must show by "'clear and convincing evidence' that the parent is unfit or otherwise not
entitled to custody" of the child (quoting Blackburn v. Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d 821, 825 (Ga. 1982)));
Grover v. Phillips, 681 P.2d 81, 83 (Okla. 1984) (explaining that a biological parent must
affirmatively, not comparatively, be proven an unfit parent).
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has successfully satisfied its burden of proof will the court apply the best
interest standard to determine who the child's custodian should be.42
Some jurisdictions have become dissatisfied with the parental
preference standard. The inability of third parties to meet their burden of
proof is troubling to some courts because it prevents them from
conducting a best interest analysis to ensure that the child's interest is
being served by their decision.4 3 The Supreme Court of Idaho circumvented the parental preference standard in Stockwell v. Stockwell" by
holding that in certain circumstances,4 5 stepparents can bypass the
parental preference standard. The court stated that when the child has
been living with a stepparent for a long period of time, resulting in a
"longstanding, substantial custodial and parental relationship," courts
should determine custody based on the best interest of the child and not
apply the parental preference standard.46 The Stockwell court found that
such a relationship existed in this case. 7 Among the factors the court
took into account were that the stepfather had been the only father the
child had ever known; he had custody equivalent to the custody rights
the mother enjoyed; and he had virtually sole custody of the child for
two and one-half years.4 8
Other jurisdictions dissatisfied with the parental preference standard
have turned to the best interest standard as the sole test in all third-party
custody disputes.49 Under this view, the rights of even a fit parent must
yield if the best interest of the child demands placement with the third
party5 0 This standard gives courts the flexibility to make custody
decisions centered around the needs and welfare of the child, the ultimate

42. See Bennett, 356 N.E.2d at 283; Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41.
43. See Richards, supra note 12, at 1246.
44. 775 P.2d 611 (Idaho 1989).

45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. at 614.
Id.
See id.
See id.

49. See Fine & Fine, supra note 5, at 56; Haynie, supra note 35, at 721-26.
50. Hawaii has statutorily adopted a best interest standard that has been described by some
commentators as the broadest statute pertaining to third-party custody disputes. See StatutoryReview,
supra note 17, at 21. The statute provides, in part, that:
(2) Custody may be awarded to persons other than the father or mother whenever the
award serves the best interest of the child. Any person who has had de facto custody of

the child in a stable and wholesome home and is a fit and proper person shall be entitled
prima facie to an award of custody ....

HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-46 (1993).
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51
goal of any custody dispute.
In summary, family law has been slow to respond to the growing
need for clear and comprehensive rules that define the rights and
responsibilities of parties to the stepparent-child relationship.52 Most
state legislatures and courts do not impose statutory requirements on
stepparents to support their stepchildren during the marriage or after its
termination. Consequently, parents and stepchildren who rely on the
stepparent for economic support may be left in a state of financial disarray if such support is terminated. 3 Although the law has been more
progressive in the area of stepparent visitation, most jurisdictions
providing for such visitation require the stepparent to show that it is in
the "best interest" of the child. 4 The courts' application of differing
definitions of "best interest," however, have led to inconsistent results.
In the area of custody, the parental preference rule is employed in
most jurisdictions. This is a very difficult standard for stepparents and
other third parties to overcome, 5 and as a result, stepparents are
frequently denied the opportunity to maintain the strong emotional bonds
that they develop with their stepchildren. Nor may the best interest of the
child be served by staying with the biological or legal parent, even
though the biological or legal parent may be fit. Given the growing
number of stepfamilies and the corresponding growing number of
stepfamily dissolutions,56 courts and legislatures need to create new
rules, or at least modify the old ones, to properly define and protect the
stepfamily relationship.

1I.

IN LOcO PARENTIS AND THE STEPRELATIONSHIP

At common law, and in most states, the mere existence of a
stepparent-child relationship confers no rights and imposes no obligations
on either party.57 As the rate of remarriage increases, however, steppar-

51. See McGaffin v. Roberts, 479 A.2d 176, 181 (Conn. 1984). For a discussion of the best
interest standard from a psychological perspective, see Linda Whobrey Rohman et al., The Best
Interests of the Child in Custody Disputes, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
59-105 (Lois A. Weithom ed. 1987).

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Fine & Fine, supra note 5, at 63; Mahoney, supranote 10, at 39.
See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 54.
See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
See CENsus, supra note 2, at 6 tbl.D.

See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 355 (N.J. 1984); Rutkowski v. Wasko, 143

N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (App. Div. 1955); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978); see also 59 AM.

JURL 2D Parent and Child § 78 (1987).
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ents will have more opportunities to develop "parent-child" relationships
with their stepchildren.5 8 Moreover, it has become increasingly evident
that a person other than a biological or legal parent can, in a child's eyes,
fulfill the parental function by providing the care, sustenance, and
support the child needs. 9 These "parent-child" relationships deserve
protection by our legal system, notfrom it. The in loco parentis doctrine
can serve as a court's tool toward protecting these relationships. A
finding of an in loco parentis relationship allows courts to confer
parental rights6" and obligations 6 on stepparents who have established
this type of relationship with their stepchildren.62 Typically, stepparents
are more likely to enter into this status with their stepchildren when the

58. See Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 1991). In Hickenbottom, the
Nebraska Supreme Court stated:
Clearly, a stepfather and his young stepchildren who live in a family environment may
develop deep and lasting mutual bonds of affection. Courts must acknowledge the fact
that a stepfather (or stepmother) may be the only parent that the child has truly known
and loved during its minority. A stepparent may be as devoted and concerned about the
welfare of a stepchild as a natural parent would be.
1d. at 12 (quoting Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 881 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)).
59. For a detailed discussion of this concept, see generally James B. Boskey, The Swamps of
Home: A Reconstruction of the Parent-ChildRelationship, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 805 (1995).
60. A non-custodial biological or legal parent is usually entitled to visitation rights with his
or her child unless the parent's visitation will endanger the child's general welfare. See Spells, 378
A.2d at 883. In the absence of legislation, courts have used the in loco parentis doctrine to confer
this parental right on stepparents as well. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788, 792-93
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Gribble, 583 P.2d at 68. Courts have also used in loco parentis to confer
on stepparents the parental right to custody of their children. See, e.g., Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424,
427-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
However, one area where the in locoparentisdoctrine has failed to produce changes is state
intestacy law, where state schemes generally do not provide stepfamily members with any rights to
inheritance. See generally Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law oflntestateSuccession and
Wills, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 917 (1989).
61. The court in Rutkowski discussed some of the parental obligations a stepparent found to
be in loco parentis faces:
The relationship should be found to exist only if the facts and circumstances show that
the step-parent means to take the place of the lawful father not only in providing support
but also with reference to the natural father's office of educating and instructing and
caring for the general welfare of the child.
143 N.Y.S.2d at 5; see also Miller, 478 A.2d at 355 (holding that an in loco parentisstepparent is
presumed to have assumed the responsibility of maintaining, rearing, and educating the child); In
re Fowler, 288 A.2d 463, 466 (Vt. 1972) (finding that a stepparent must assume the burdens and
duties of support and maintenance of the children to be considered in loco parentis);Boskey, supra
note 59, at 812 (discussing several duties and obligations a parent owes to a child, such as the duties
to provide, protect, and nurture).
62. See, e.g., Loomis v. State, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822-23 (Ct. App. 1964).
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non-custodial parent is absent from the child's life or deceased.63
In Spells v. Spells.' a Pennsylvania court formulated the in loco
parentis doctrine as follows:
[A] person may "put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by
assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship without
going through the formality of a legal adoption. This status, [known as
'in loco parentis'] embodies two ideas; first, the assumption of a
parental status, and second, the discharge of parental duties. ' 6 "The
rights and liabilities arising out of that relation are, as the words imply,
exactly the same as between parent and child. 66
The stepparent or the child has the right to terminate the in loco parentis
relationship at will.67
The intent of the stepparent to enter into the relationship and assume
the status of a parent is critical to any in loco parentisdetermination. The
lack of stepparent intent to take the place of a missing biological or legal
parent and assume, to his or her exclusion and relief, the burdens and
duties of parenthood, precludes a finding of in loco parentis.5 Even if
the stepparent has assumed some parental duties toward the child, a court
will not hold that an in loco parentis relationship exists without proof of
intent. 69 For example, in Montell v. Department of Social and Health

63. See, e.g., Simmons, 486 N.W.2d at 789 (biological father had no contact with child and
had surrendered his parental rights); Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d at 10 (stepfather lived with the child
since the age of two; biological father had no contact with the child and did not contribute to her
support); Drawbaugh v. Drawbaugh, 647 A.2d 240, 240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (child had not seen
his natural father since he was eight months old and defendant stepfather was the only father the
child had ever known); Quinn v. Mouw-Quinn, No. 19045, 1996 WL 457296, at *1 (S.D. Aug. 14,
1996) (child born out of wedlock and stepfather was the only father the child had ever known); E.H.
v. M.H., 512 N.W.2d 148 (S.D. 1994) (as of date of trial, natural father had not been in contact with
the children for II years).
64. 378 A.2d 879.
65. Id.at 881-82 (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Morgan v. Smith, 241
A.2d 531, 533 (Pa. 1968)).
66. Id. (quoting Young v. Hipple, 117 A. 185, 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1922)).
67. See, e.g., Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 854 (Alaska 1982); Gribble v. Gribble, 583
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978); In re Marriage of Farrell, 835 P.2d 267, 270 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
Ordinarily, an in loco parentis relationship established during the marriage is seen as ending upon
divorce. See Fine & Fine, supra note 5, at 52. This view is misleading because termination by
divorce can only be determined in the context of either the stepparent or the child choosing to
terminate the status at that time. See Gribble, 583 P.2d at 67. The rights, duties, and obligations
arising from the status continue as long as they choose to continue the relationship. See id.
68. See Paquette v. Paquette, 499 A.2d 23, 27 (Vt. 1985); Fine & Fine, supra note 5, at 52.
69. See In re Fowler, 288 A.2d 463, 466 (Vt. 1972) (finding that the stepfather was not in an
in loco parentis relationship because he never intended to assume parental duties over the
stepchildren, despite the fact that he contributed to the support of his stepchildren during the
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Services,7" a Washington appellate court held that the stepfather was not
in loco parentiswith his stepchildren, even though they resided with him
and their mother, and were financially supported by him for two years
while the biological father was incarcerated.7 The court found that the
stepfather never intended to assume a custodial stepparent relationship
with his stepchildren and consequently should not have been forced to
contribute financially to their support.72
Courts require proof of intent as a matter of public policy for fear
that stepparents, never intending to assume parental status, may be
hesitant to bring stepchildren into their home voluntarily if they could be
subjected to parental obligations such as continuing financial support."
The intent requirement allows stepparents the freedom to choose the type
of relationship they wish to establish with their stepchildren, without the
fear of being subjected to obligations and duties they never intended to
assume.
As noted above, an in loco parentis finding allows courts to treat
stepparents as biological or legal parents by conferring to them parental
rights and obligations which they would not otherwise possess. 74 For
example, various courts have used the in loco parentis doctrine: (1) to
impose support obligations on stepparents; 71 (2) to award post-dissolution visitation to stepparents; 76 and (3) to bypass the parental preference
standard in custody disputes.77 The use of the in loco parentis doctrine
in the following analysis of case law demonstrates that some courts have
recognized the important status the stepfamily has achieved in our
shifting society and the need for the law to react accordingly.

marriage to the mother).

70. 775 P.2d 976 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
71. See id. at 979.
72. See id.

73. See id.; see also In re Marriage of Holcomb, 471 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
74. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.

75. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss1/6

12

Levine: Divorce and the Modern Family: Providing In Loco Parentis Steppar

1996]

A.

STEPPARENT STANDING

The Use of In Loco Parentis to Impose ParentalRights and
Obligations on Stepparents

1. In Loco Parentisand Stepparent Support Obligations
Absent statutory authority to the contrary,78 stepparents are not
obligated to support their stepchildren during the marriage if they choose
not to do so. 7' However, a finding of in loco parentis has been held to
abrogate this general principle. In In re Marriage of Farrell," the
Washington Court of Appeals found that the child's stepfather stood in
loco parentis with the child while she lived with her stepfather and
mother. 1 Consequently, the court held that the stepfather had a
common law duty to support the child for the period in which she lived
82
with him.
2. In Loco Parentisand Stepparent Visitation
Few states have statutes which explicitly confer visitation privileges
on stepparents after termination of the marriage. 3 In response, some
courts have used the in loco parentis doctrine to protect and maintain the
strong emotional bonds which stepparents and children often develop
with one another during the course of their relationship.' The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. Simmons 85 exemplifies this
approach. The court held that a former stepparent who was in loco

78. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
79. See Drawbaugh v. Drawbaugh, 647 A.2d 240, 241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
80. 835 P.2d 267 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
81. See id. at 270.
82. See id.; see also Brummitt v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.2d 37,39 (Ky. 1962) (holding that
a stepfather who was in loco parentis with his stepson had an obligation to support the child
financially).
Generally, this support obligation ceases upon termination of the marriage, even if the in
locoparentisrelationship continues to exist. See, e.g., Drawbaugh, 647 A.2d at 242; Commonwealth
ex rel McNutt v. McNutt, 496 A.2d 816, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). But see Miller v. Miller, 478
A.2d 351, 359 (NJ. 1984) (holding that "in appropriate cases, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may
be invoked to impose on a stepparent the duty to support a stepchild after a divorce from the child's
natural parent").
83. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101 (Vest 1994); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-1616(h)
(West Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303 (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2
(Michie 1995); \VIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1993).
84. In Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977), the court asserted that "when a
stepparent is 'in loco parentis' with his stepchildren, courts must jealously guard his rights to
visitation." Id. at 883.
85. 486 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
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parentis with his former stepchild could be entitled to visitation rights if
it was in the best interest of the child. 6
Some courts use the in loco parentis doctrine to aid in the
interpretation of vague statutory language applicable to stepparent
visitation cases. For example, in Gribble v. Gribble,"7 a stepfather
sought visitation rights with his stepson as part of the divorce decree.88
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with a statute that gave the court the
power to grant visitation rights to "parents, grandparents, and other relatives." 89 The court held that stepparents found to be in loco parentis
with their stepchildren are "parents" for the purposes of the statute and
90
can be awarded visitation rights with their former stepchildren.
3. In Loco Parentisand the Parental Preference Standard in
Stepparent Custody Cases
In jurisdictions where some form of the parental preference standard
is recognized, 91 conflict arises when an in loco parentis stepparent and
a fit biological or legal parent fight over custody of the child. In this
situation, most courts will not deprive the biological or legal parent of
custody, despite the stepparent's relationship with the child.92 However,
such a determination could operate against a child's best interest.
93
Recognizing this, a Florida appeals court, in Gorman v. Gorman,
affirmed a trial court's decision to award custody of the child to his
stepmother, despite the fact that the biological father was a fit parent.94
The court reasoned that the stepmother was the child's psychological
parent95 and had treated him as her own child for almost the child's

86. See id. at 791.
87. 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).

88. See id. at 65.
89. Id. at 66 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1953)). The current version of this statute
has replaced "other relatives" with "other member[s] of the immediate family." UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-5 (Supp. 1995).

90. See Gribble, 583 P.2d at 68; see also In re Custody of D.M.M., 404 N.W.2d 530, 534-36
(Wis. 1987) (holding that a great-aunt who stood in loco parends with her niece could be defined
as a "parent" where a state statute gave the court authority to grant visitation rights to "parents,
grandparents, or great-grandparents").
91. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.

92. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982).
93. 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).

94. See id. at 78.
95. See id.; see also BEST INTERESTS, supra note 5, at 17-20. The "psychological parent"
concept finds its legal basis explicitly or implicitly in the in loco parentis doctrine. See Carter v.
Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 853 & n.2 (Alaska 1982).
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entire life.96 The court noted that applying the parental preference
standard would have conflicted with the best interest of the child. 97
B. A Proposalfor Ensuring Certainty in In Loco Parentis
Determinations
Courts have not developed a standard test to determine whether a
"parent-child" relationship exists to the degree that would justify a
finding of in loco parentis status. Generally, courts look to the facts and
circumstances of each case to determine its existence. 98 However, the
importance of protecting the welfare of all children involved in the
judicial process99 demands that courts be provided with a test which
they can apply when faced with an in loco parentis issue.'
Based on the above analysis of case law, the following approach

would provide courts with the means to ensure certainty in their in loco
parentis determinations. The existence of in loco parentis should be
deemed established if the person alleging its existence satisfies each
element of the following four-part test.' 0' The first element requires

96. See Gorman, 400 So. 2d at 78.
97. See id. at 77-78.
98. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Smith, 64 N.W.2d 781,785 (Minn. 1954)); In re Fowler, 288
A.2d 463,466 (Vt. 1972) (citing Rutkowski v. Wasko, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (App. Div. 1955)). Some
courts look at several factors when undertaking an in loco parentis analysis. In McManus v. Hinney,
151 N.W.2d 44 (Wis. 1967), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin looked at "the children's ages, their
dependence upon the person claimed to stand in loco parentis, and whether such person in fact
supports the children and exercises the duties and obligations of a natural parent" as relevant factors
in any in locoparentisanalysis. Id. at 45-46; see also Hush v. Devilbiss Co., 259 N.W.2d 170, 17475 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (using a similar set of factors as the McManus court used and found that
the plaintiff's grandmother stood in loco parentis to child since she had taken care of him for an
extended period of time and performed the day-to-day tasks of caring for the child when the mother
could not do so because of illness).
99. See, e.g., Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611,613 (Idaho 1989); Hutchison v. Hutchison,
649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982) (stating that "[i]n a controversy over custody, the paramount
consideration is the best interest of the child").
100. For the purposes of this Note, this proposed test will focus on the stepparent-child
relationship. However, application of the in loco parentis doctrine is not limited to stepparent-child
relationships. See, eg., Hadden v. Kero-Sun, Inc., 602 N.Y.S.2d 880, 882 (App. Div. 1993)
(grandparent); Vicki N. v. Josephine N., 649 A.2d 709, 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (aunt). Therefore,
this proposed test should be applied in any situation where a court finds itself faced with the need
to make an in loco parentis determination.
101. Both the stepparent or other nonparent and the biological or legal parent can allege the
existence of in loco parentisbetween the nonparent and the child. Natural parents typically seek in
loco parents determinations in an effort to convince courts to impose child support obligations on
the nonparent. See In re Marriage of Holcomb, 471 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991);
Drawbaugh v. Dravbaugh, 647 A.2d 240, 241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). In comparison, nonparents will
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proof that the stepparent accepted the child into their household. A
stepparent cannot be deemed in loco parentis with a child unless he or
she had accepted the child into his or her household at the time the in
loco parentis relationship was established. 2 Acceptance into the
stepparent's household is important because it establishes the base from
which the "parent-child" relationship will grow.
Second, the party claiming the existence of in loco parentis must
show that the stepparent supported the child during the relationship, both
financially and emotionally. 3 The assumption of financial support is
critical to the analysis because of its development as a fundamental
obligation of a parent toward their child.
Parental obligations to provide financial support for minor
children are an essential part of the family laws. This principle was
recognized as a moral obligation even before it was embodied in
law ....
Support obligations within the nuclear family are an efficient
mechanism whereby society assures the economic well-being of its
members."'
To prove emotional support, evidence of a mutually close and loving
relationship between the child and the stepparent must exist.'0 5 The
type of evidence that will satisfy this element is contingent on the facts
of each case. For example, length of the relationship cannot be a
determinative factor because loving stepparent-child relationships may
develop in a short amount of time,"0 6 while others may not develop at
all, even after several years. 7 The emotional support requirement

seek a finding of in locoparentisstatus in the hopes of receiving a visitation award from the court.
See Simmons, 486 N.W.2d at 790-91; Ray v. Ray, No. 89-B4, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4696, at *3-5
(Dec. 14, 1989); Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 881-92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
102. See Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 355 (N.J. 1984); In re Montell v. Department of Social
and Health Servs., 775 P.2d 976, 978-79 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
103. See Loomis v. State, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Brummitt v.
Commonwealth, 357 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962); Devilbiss, 259 N.W.2d at 174-75;
Drawbaugh, 647 A.2d at 243.
104. Mahoney, supra note 10, at 40.
105. See Simmons, 486 N.W.2d at 791; Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8, 17
(Neb. 1991); Ray, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4696, at *3-4.
106. See, e.g., Simmons, 486 N.W.2d at 790 (finding a close relationship between stepparent
and child required by the in locoparentisdoctrine even though the marriage to the biological mother
lasted less than two years).
107. See, e.g., McManus v. Hinney, 151 N.W.2d 44, 47-48 (Wis. 1967) (finding that the
stepfather was not in loco parentis with his stepchildren even though an eight year relationship
existed between them).
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ensures that courts will find an in loco parentis relationship only where
a true, emotional "parent-child" relationship exists.
Third, a court must consider the involvement of the stepparent in the
day-to-day care of the child. Simply being around the child is not
enough. The stepparent must act in such a way that demonstrates he or
she has a genuine interest in the everyday well-being and general welfare
of the child. 8 This element may be satisfied through evidence of
educational planning,"0 9 performance of everyday household duties for
the child, "0 discipline of the child,"' and the performance of advisory functions for the child." 2 The function of this eleinent is to give
courts greater insight into the extent of the stepparent-child relationship
before them. A stepparent that is heavily involved in the day-to-day
activities of the child's life is more likely to develop a true "parent-child"
relationship with the child than a stepparent who takes little interest in
the child's life." 3
Finally, there must be a showing of intent on the part of the
stepparent to be in this status with the child. This demands evidence that
the stepparent intended to assume the burdens and duties of parenthood;
the lack thereof will prevent a finding of in loco parentis even if the
other three elements of this test are satisfied."4 For example, in In re
Fowler,"5 the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the stepfather was
not in loco parentis with his stepchildren even though he lived with the
children, financially supported them, and exercised some care and
guidance over them," 6 because the stepfather never intended to enter
into that relationship.
This four-element test provides courts with needed focus in applying

108. See Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d at 17; Rutkowski v. Wasko, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (App. Div.
1955).
109. See Rutkowski, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 5; Ray, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4696, at *4.

110. See Loomis v. State, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822 (Ct. App. 1964).
111. See id.; Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d at 17.
112. See Loomis, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
113. As some commentators have stated:
Unlike adults, children have no psychological conception of relationship by
blood-tie until quite late in their development.... What registers in their minds are the
day-to-day interchanges with the adults who take care of them and who, on the strength
of these, become the parent figures to whom they are attached.
BEST INTERESTS, supra note 5, at 12-13.

114. For a discussion of the intent requirement and the policy behind its existence see supra
notes 68-73 and accompanying text.

115. 288 A.2d 463 (Vt. 1972).
116. Seeid.at466.
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the nebulous in loco parentis doctrine. If each element of the test is
satisfied, the court should have no doubt that the stepparent assumed a
parental role in the child's life to the extent that the relationship demands
recognition and protection by the law. Although such a test clearly limits
a court's discretion in applying this doctrine, society's expectation that
the legal system will protect the general welfare of children demands that
courts have the ability to make the most informed and responsible
decisions possible on their behalf.
C. Summary
Without the in loco parentis doctrine, many stepparents would be
unable to effectuate the best interests of their stepchildren. In loco
parentis serves as a stopgap, filling holes still existing in stepfamily law
by protecting real "parental" relationships between stepparents (as well
as other third parties) and stepchildren." 7 The doctrine recognizes that
a "parent" does not necessarily have to be a biological or legal mother
or father. However, as Part IV demonstrates, many courts continue to
cling to their outdated ideas about the stepfamily, failing to recognize
that in some instances the "step" in stepparent may just be a misleading
term of art.
IV.

THE STEPPARENT STANDING PROBLEM IN DISSOLUTION
PROCEEDINGS

Most states empower their courts to hear child custody matters in
several different settings. These settings include guardianship, habeas
corpus, dependency and neglect proceedings, and marriage dissolution
proceedings." 8 This Note focuses on child custody determinations
within dissolution proceedings.
Courts do not possess unlimited power to hear custody disputes
within dissolution proceedings. Before a court can decide a custody issue
it must first have jurisdiction to hear the dispute." 9 A finding of no

117. See Boskey, supra note 59, at 823 (arguing that where an "individual is meeting or has
met a substantial proportion of the parental duties, it is appropriate that he or she should be
recognized as an effective parent of the child, and that both the child and that person should acquire
the mutual rights that attach to parenthood").
118. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 72.
119. See, e.g., Olvera v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 925, 928-29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Morrow
v. Morrow, 345 A.2d 561, 562-63 (Conn. 1974).
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jurisdiction denies standing 2 ' to custody disputants and can act as an
absolute bar to custody claims within the proceeding. Stepparents, in
particular, are affected by such a finding since dissolution jurisdictional
statutes do not deal expressly with stepchildren. 1 ' Divorcing stepparents suing for custody of their stepchildren face potential problems in
states which: (1) have adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act"2 ("UMDA") or (2) have enacted legislation that only authorizes
courts to3 make custody determinations as to "children of the mar12
riage."
A.

Stepparent Standing Under Custody Jurisdiction
Statutes Adopted from the UMDA

The UMDA was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") in 1970 in an attempt to
stimulate reform of state divorce laws. 24 Section 401(d) of the Act
details the jurisdiction requirements of child custody hearings within
divorce proceedings as follows:
(d) A child custody proceeding is commenced in the [ . ] court:
(1) by a parent, by filing a petition
(i) for dissolution or legal separation; or
(ii) for custody of the child in the [county, judicial district]
in which he is permanently resident or found; or
(2) by a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for
custody of the child in the [county, judicial district] in which he
is permanently resident or found, but only if he is not in the physical
custody of one of his parents. 25
States which have adopted custody jurisdiction statutes of this type
128
Kentucky, 129 Minnesoinclude Arizona, 126 Colorado,127 Illinois,

120. A litigant must have standing for the controversy to be heard by a court. The standing of
litigants is one of the components of a court's subject matter jurisdiction. See In re Custody of
1986).
Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ill.
121. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 62.
122. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987).
123. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2010 (Vest Supp. 1996). See also infra notes 148-49 and
accompanying text. Some states adopting these statutes use similar language that conveys the same
idea. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (2)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1996) ("minor child of the parties");
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (Vest Supp. 1996) ("minor children of the parties").

124. See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTON 66-79 (1988).
125. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401(d), 9A U.L.A. 550.

126. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-331 (West 1991).
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Stepparents seeking custody

of stepchildren in these jurisdictions face a daunting task of achieving
standing, unless the child 1is34not in the physical custody 33 of one of its
biological or legal parents.

For example, in Olvera v. Superior Court,3 a stepmother petitioned for custody of her stepdaughter during a dissolution proceeding
between herself and the child's biological father.'36 The Arizona Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of standing to the stepmother.
The court held that the custody jurisdiction statute 37 gave Arizona
courts power to grant standing to stepparents only when the stepchild is

127. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-123 (West 1989). Colorado's statute differs to some
degree from the UMDA in that it codifies UMDA § 401(d)(2), but also adds a second option that
allows a custody proceeding to be commenced "[b]y a person other than a parent who has had
physical custody of a child for a period of six months or more, if such action is commenced within
six months of the termination of such physical custody." Id. § 14-10-123(1)(c).
128. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601 (West Supp. 1996).
129. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.420(4) (Michie 1984).
130. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.156 (West Supp. 1996). Although clearly adopted from the
UMDA, this statute is different in one significant way. Under the Minnesota statute, when a
nonparent commences a custody proceeding, that person does not have to prove that the child is not
in the physical custody of one of his parents. Compare UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
§ 401(d), 9A U.L.A. 550, with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.156.
131. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-211 (1995).
132. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.030 (West Supp. 1996). This statute deals specifically
with custody proceedings commenced by third parties only, essentially codifying UMDA § 401 (d)(2)
separately. In addition, this statute offers stepparents and other third parties an additional method to
establish standing to commence a custody proceeding if they allege "that neither parent is a suitable
custodian." Id.
133. A physical custody determination is not based solely on physical possession of the child
at the time custody litigation is commenced. It depends on who is providing for the care, custody,
and welfare of the child prior to the initiation of the custody proceeding. See In re Marriage of
Nicholas, 524 N.E.2d 728, 731-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
134. See, e.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33,35 (Ky. 1979) (finding that stepmother had
standing to sue for custody of her stepson within the dissolution action since the child was residing
with her when she filed the petition for custody). Some jurisdictions which have adopted part of or
all of the UMDA continue to use the parental preference standard once the court finds it has
jurisdiction to commence the custody proceeding; thus, adding an additional obstacle for stepparents.
Consequently, a stepparent must pass two difficult hurdles before a court will implement a best
interest analysis: (1) standing and (2) proving the unfitness of the custodial parent by clear and
convincing evidence. See id. In comparison, the UMDA contains only one hurdle for stepparents to
pass, since the Act requires courts to apply a straight best interest analysis once the nonparent is able
to achieve standing. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561. The protections
inherent in the parental preference standard have already been incorporated in § 401 (d). See id. § 401
cmt., 9A U.L.A. 550.
135. 815 P.2d 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
136. See id. at 926.
137. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-331(B)(2) (West 1991).
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not in the physical custody of one of his or her parents. 3 8 Since the
biological father had physical custody of his daughter when the
stepmother filed the custody petition, the stepmother lacked standing to
sue for custody. t3 9 The court ignored the fact that the stepmother had
allegedly been the girl's primary caretaker since the age of two,"14
which may have resulted in a parent-child relationship between them. If
such a relationship did exist, it may have been in the best interest of the
child to grant custody to the stepmother. However, by denying standing,
the court never addressed this issue.
The potential problems stepparents can encounter with UMDA
custody legislation were demonstrated once again in Simpson v.
Simpson.'4' In this case, a stepmother filed for divorce from her second
husband and requested that the court grant her custody of her stepson.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, interpreting the jurisdiction statute, 42
held that the stepmother had standing to commence the custody
proceeding since the child was residing with her, and not his or her
father, when she filed the petition. 43 However, it is highly unlikely that
the court would have granted standing if the child had been residing with
the father when the petition was filed, since stepparents and other third
parties in Kentucky do not have standing when the child is in the custody
of one of his or her biological or legal parents.'" The court found that
the stepmother acted as the child's mother "from the time he was
seventeen months old until he was removed from her care by his father
almost six years later."'45 The court even acknowledged that she may
have stood in loco parentis with the child. 146 Hypothetically, had the

138. See Olvera, 815 P.2d at 929. The manner in which the court reached this conclusion is
very interesting because it melds a "children of the marriage" statutory analysis with a UMDA
statutory analysis. First, the court found that ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-314(A)(3) did not allow
the court to grant standing to stepparents in custody proceedings since the statute limited the court's
jurisdiction in domestic relations cases to children "common to the parties." Id. Then the court
concluded that § 25-331 (B)(2) was an exception to § 25-314(A)(3), to apply only when the stepchild
is not in the physical custody of one of his parents. See Olvera, 815 P.2d at 928-29. For further
discussion on "children of the marriage" jurisdiction statutes, see infra Part IV.B.
139. See Olvera, 815 P.2d at 929.
140. See id. at 926.
141. 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979).
142. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.420 (Michie 1984).
143. See Simpson, 586 S.W.2d at 35.
144. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.420(4)(b).
145. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d at 36.
146. See id.
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father's fitness been an issue, 147 the stepmother, who had treated the
child as her own for six years, would not have been afforded the
opportunity to question the father's fitness as a parent within the divorce
proceeding. As a result of the court's reasoning, the child's physical and
emotional well-being may be harmed.
B. Stepparent Standing Under "Children of the Marriage" Statutes

The more common custody jurisdiction legislation for dissolution
proceedings are "children of the marriage" statutes. A typical "children

of the marriage" statute looks very much like California's jurisdiction
statute which states the following:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of marriage, or
for legal separation of the parties, the court has jurisdiction to inquire
into and render any judgment and make orders that are appropriate
concerning the following:
(b) The custody of minor children of the marriage.'
Many states have enacted jurisdiction statutes similar to
California's, 49 but have yet to apply their statute in cases involving
stepparent custodial rights. However, the mere existence of these statutes
leaves open the possibility that denial of standing could become more
widespread in the future. "Children of the marriage" statutes provide easy
answers for courts that still cling to the derivative theory of the

steprelationship.150 Courts can invoke the plain meaning reading of this

statute and claim jurisdiction only over children born of the current

marriage. The Supreme Court of Connecticut came to this conclusion in

147. Kentucky courts use the parental preference standard in custody proceedings between
nonparents and biological or legal parents and will not engage in a best interest analysis unless the
custodial parent is shown to be unfit to retain custody. In this case, the stepmother conceded that the
biological father was a fit parent and the court held so as a matter of law. See id. at 35.
148. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2010 (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 1995); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-58 (West 1995); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1(a)(1) (Supp. 1995); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 580-11 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-7 (West
Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 552.16 (West 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11.2 (1995); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3 105.21(A) (Anderson Supp. 1995);
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law Co-op. 1985); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2-15 (1995).
150. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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Morrow v. Morrow.5 1 The stepfather in Morrow treated his wife's
daughter as his own; he even lied under oath that the child was his so
that her surname could be changed to Morrow. 52 The trial court
granted standing to the stepfather. The court held that his declaration of
paternity fixed the child's status as his legitimate daughter by estoppel;
thereby making her a "child of the marriage."' 3 On appeal, the supreme court gave a literal construction to the jurisdiction statute"s and
reversed the trial court's holding. The court found that if the child was
not literally born to the parties during the marriage it could only extend
jurisdiction: (1) if the child was adopted by both parties; or (2) if the
child was the biological child of one of the parties subsequently adopted
by the other party.' Since neither exception applied in this case, the
court denied jurisdiction to the stepfather, 56 even though he treated the
child as his own for six years. 7
Some courts go to considerable lengths to deny standing to
stepparents. For example, in In re Marriage of Goetz and Lewis, t5 8 the
stepfather asked for joint and physical custody of his stepson, with whom
he resided for most of the child's life. He argued to the California Court
of Appeals that he had standing to be heard on the custody issue based
on a stepparent visitation statute.' 59 The court disagreed, holding that
nothing in the statute could lead one to believe that it was "intended to
confer jurisdiction over anything other than a stepparent's visitation
rights.' ' 60 The stepfather's next argument was that the court had the
power to grant him standing, because it had the statutory authority in any
custody proceeding to "'make such order[s] for the custody of the child
during minority as may seem necessary and proper."",161 The court

151.

345 A.2d 561 (Conn. 1974).

152. See id. at 562.
153. Id.
154. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-58.
155. See id.; Morrow, 345 A.2d at 562-63.

156. See Morrow, 345 A.2d at 561-62.
157. See id. at 563.
158. 250 Cal. Rptr. 30 (Ct. App. 1988).

159. See id. at 31. California is one of the few states that has statutorily provided visitation
rights specifically for stepparents. The current version of this statute states that, "[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law, the court may grant reasonable visitation to a stepparent, if visitation by
the stepparent is determined to be in the best interest of the minor child." CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101
(West 1994).
160. Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 32.

161. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (West 1983) (repealed 1994)). This statute was reenacted as CAL. FAM. CODE § 3022 (West 1994).
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acknowledged that this statute gave it broad "substantive discretion."16 2
The court found, however, that custody jurisdiction in marital dissolution
proceedings was governed by a different statute which provided the court
with power only over minor children who are children of the marriage. 63 Since the child was not a "child of the marriage," the court
held that it could not give the stepfather standing to sue for custody.' 64
In essence, the court ignored the fact that the stepfather had fulfilled a
parental role for virtually the entire life of the child. 65
Goetz's reasoning was upheld by the California Court of Appeals in
the intriguing case of In re Marriage of Hinman.'6 In Hinman, the
biological mother appealed the trial court's award ofjoint custody of two
children to her husband, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction over
them since her husband was not the biological father. The court held that
the biological mother had invoked the court's jurisdiction over the
stepchildren by naming them as "children of the marriage" on her
divorce petition." This action estopped her from challenging the
custody order on jurisdictional grounds. 6 However, the court made it
very clear that under normal circumstances it had no statutory basis to
extend jurisdiction over the stepchildren due to the restricting "children
169
of the marriage" language of the jurisdiction statute.
C.

The Problems Caused by JurisdictionalRestrictions

Withholding standing to stepparents to sue for custody of their
stepchildren in dissolution proceedings can lead to serious repercussions
on stepparents, stepchildren, and the judicial system as a whole.
The majority of jurisdictions apply some form of the parental
preference standard to third-party custody disputes, requiring that the
custodial biological or legal parent be proven unfit or that some proof of

162. Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
163. See id. at 33; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351 (West 1983) (repealed 1994). This statute was reenacted as CAL. FAm. CODE § 2010 (West Supp. 1996).

164. See Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 32-33.
165. The court noted that the evidence indicated a possibility that the stepfather and mother and
child maintained a family unit during the unmarried cohabitation and subsequent marriage. The court

found that the stepfather had "exercised the obligations and responsibilities of a father or contributed
financially to [the child's] needs before or after the marriage to [the mother], and [the stepfather
demonstrated] interest in adopting [the child]." Id. at 31.
166. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245 (Ct. App. 1992).

167. Id. at 247.
168. See id. at 248.
169. Id. at 247.
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unfitness be presented before a court can examine what would be in the
best interest of the child. 7 When a court holds that it has no jurisdiction to grant standing to stepparents, it allows a biological or legal
parent, as a matter of law, to retain custody of his or her child. 7 1 Thus,
divorce courts are left without means to discover a biological or legal
parent's unfitness, even though 1in72 theory, an unfit parent is not entitled
to retain custody of its children.
For example, in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne,7 3 an Ohio appeals
court, faced with a "children of the marriage" statute, 74 found that
under normal circumstances it would not be able to invoke its jurisdiction
over the stepchildren because the children were not born of the
marriage.75 The trial court found evidence that the biological mother
was unfit and awarded temporary custody of the stepchildren to the state
welfare department, pending the disposition by the juvenile court. 6
The court of appeals affirmed on a procedural technicality. 7 7 However,
had that technicality not arisen, the court would have had no choice but
to reverse the lower court's holding since the trial court did not have the
authority to make orders concerning the children not born of the
marriage. As a result, the court's only option would have been to return
the children to the custody of the mother until the juvenile court
determined the issue of her parental fitness. This is quite a dangerous
result being that the trial court already found the mother unfit.
This problem exists under statutes derived from the UMDA as well.
For example, suppose X, the biological mother, sues Y, the stepfather,
for divorce. Y petitions the divorce court for custody of his stepchild, Z,
arguing that he can prove that X is an unfit parent. However, at the time
of the petition, Z is in X's custody. Courts interpreting their state's

170. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text_
171. See supra Part IV.A-B.
172. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
173. 185 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
174. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.21 (Anderson Supp. 1995).
175. See Hartshorne, 185 N.E.2d at 330; see also State ex rel. McCarroll v. Marion County
Superior Court, 515 N.E.2d 1124 (Ind. 1987) (holding that "child of the marriage" language in
Indiana's jurisdiction statute prevented the court presiding over the dissolution proceeding from
exercising custody jurisdiction over the stepson, despite allegations that the child was in danger due
to the mother's neglect and erratic behavior).
176. See Hartshorne, 185 N.E.2d at 330.

177. The mother had not complied with a law that required her, as an appellant, to give a bond
approved by the court from whose decree the appeal is being taken. The court held that the act of
giving bond was "a prerequisite to the perfecting of the appeal and is the only method by which an
appeal in these domestic relation cases may be effected." Id. at 331.
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version of UMDA § 401(d) would probably hold that Y has no standing,
since X had custody of Z when the custody petition was filed.'7 8 This
would force Y to commence a separate custodial action pursuant to the
stricter standards of that state's juvenile court act.'79 However, the extra
time needed to commence the separate proceeding could be detrimental
to the child, since the child may be endangered if left in the care of an
unfit parent longer than necessary.
As discussed above, the primary reason courts deny standing to
stepparents is to prevent intrusion on the custodial rights of biological
and legal parents.8 0 However, in doing so, courts create an absolute
preference for biological or legal parents in custody proceedings. 8'
Biological and legal parents of minor children have the constitutional
right to the custody of such children.'8 Their custodial rights, however,
are sufficiently protected by existing substantive standards applicable to
third-party custody disputes which, by themselves, create substantial
obstacles for stepparents to overcome. 83 This right is checked by the
courts' power to take custody away if the biological or legal parent is
found to be an unfit parent.18' Denial of standing snatches this checking power away from a court.
A court's refusal to grant standing to any stepparent can operate
against the best interest of a stepchild. The paramount consideration in
any custody dispute is supposed to be the best interest of the child.'85
As the rate of remarriage increases, 8 6 the potential exists that more
children will develop meaningful emotional bonds with their stepparents.

178. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401(d)(2), 9A U.L.A. 550 (1987).
179. The commentary to UMDA § 401 states:
[S]ubsection (d)(2) makes it clear that if one of the parents has physical custody of the
child, a non-parent may not bring an action to contest that parent's right to continuing
custody .... If a non-parent... wants to acquire custody, he must commence
proceedings under the far more stringent standards for intervention provided in the typical
Juvenile Court Act.
Id. § 401 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 550.
180. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
181. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 73.
182. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Pierce,
645 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Mont. 1982).
183. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 73; see also supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); In re
M.M.L., 900 P.2d 813, 819 (Kan. 1995); Doe v. Doe, 399 N.Y.S.2d 977, 978 (Sup. Ct. 1977); In
re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765, 778 (Wash. 1942).
185. See, e.g., Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611,613 (Idaho 1989); Hutchison v. Hutchison,
649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982).
186. See CENSUS, supra note 2, at 5.
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These emotional bonds may become so strong that upon termination of
the marriage, it may be in the best interest of the child to be placed in
87
the custody of the stepparent and not the biological or legal parent.

Commentators have noted that "[e]ach child's development unfolds in
response to the environmental influences to which he is exposed. His

emotional, intellectual, and moral capacities prosper, not in a void, and
not without conflict, within his family relationships, and these determine

his social reactions."' 88 Depending on the factual situation, vesting
custody in a stepparent may be the best option toward furthering a
child's emotional development.

Extraordinary circumstances may also exist that would justify an
award of custody to a stepparent based on the best interest of the

child." 9 In these cases, however, denial of standing bars an analysis of
the best interest of the stepchild. A Florida appeals court recognized this
problem in Golstein v. Golstein,90 by reversing the lower court's
refusal to grant a stepfather standing to petition for custody of his
stepson. The appellate court held that its custody jurisdiction was not
restricted to the "'minor children of the parties"""' since Florida's
circuit courts have "inherent jurisdiction to entertain matters pertaining
to custody and enter any orders appropriate to that child's welfare.' 9"
Not all courts follow Golstein's analysis, however. In Olvera v.
Superior Court,193 an Arizona appeals court, interpreting a UMDA
statute, 94 held that it had no power to grant a stepmother standing to

187. See Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982).
188. BEST INTERESTS, supra note 5, at 10.
189. See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 284 (N.Y. 1976) (finding the protracted
separation of the mother from the child, combined with the mother's lack of an established
household, her unwed state, and the child's attachment to her nonparent custodian, constituted
extraordinary circumstances warranting an examination of the best interest of the child); In re
Marriage of Allen, 626 P.2d 16,21 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that the child's physical handicap
constituted an extraordinary circumstance, and the stepmother's ability to help the child deal with
the handicap justified a custody award to the stepmother upon divorce based on the child's best
interest, despite the acknowledged fitness of the natural father).
190. 442 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
191. Id. at 330 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b) (West 1981)). Florida's statute also
states that "[t]he court shall determine all matters relating to custody of each minor child of the
parties ...."FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
192. Golstein, 442 So. 2d at 330. But see Phillips v. Phillips, 156 P.2d 199, 200-03 (Or. 1945)
(holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to provide the wife with custody of her stepchildren
because they were not "children of the marriage," even though the record was full of allegations of
physical and emotional abuse of the children by the natural father).
193. 815 P.2d 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
194. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-311(B) (West 1991).
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sue for custody of her stepdaughter,'95 even though she alleged that she
was the child's primary caretaker for most of the child's life. 9 6 Courts
exercising similar reasoning must realize that denying standing to
stepparents is potentially harmful to the best interest of the child.
Stepparents who treat their stepchild as their own are wrongfully treated
in the same manner as those stepparents who have never developed
meaningful relationships with their stepchildren. As a result, stepparents
are prevented from petitioning for custody due solely to their legal status,
regardless of the role they may play in the child's life.
The problems caused by denying standing are not limited in effect
to stepchildren, and biological or legal parents. Denial of standing can
have adverse effects on a state's entire judicial system, as it forces
stepparents who refuse to give up the fight for custody to commence
proceedings in other forums.' 97 However, the existence of other forums
is not a justifiable reason for withholding jurisdiction in the dissolution
proceeding. The standards for custodial intervention in these other forums
98
are far more stringent than those found in dissolution proceedings.
Stepparents already face substantial hurdles in dissolution proceedings in
trying to overcome substantive third-party custody standards once they
achieve standing.' 99 In addition, forcing the stepparent to commence a
separate proceeding does not serve the purposes ofjudicial economy. The
court system could just as easily deal with the custody issue within the
existing dissolution proceeding.
V.

SOLVING THE STEPPARENT STANDING PROBLEM

Denial of standing to stepparents who do not establish close
relationships with their stepchildren is not a serious problem for two
reasons. First, common sense dictates that stepparents who are not close
with their stepchildren are very unlikely to even want custody after
termination of the marriage. Second, the lack of closeness or emotional
ties between a child and a stepparent infers that it would not be in the
child's best interest to be in their custody. Therefore, conferring standing
to all stepparents would be unnecessary, judicially inefficient, and beyond
the intent of the legislatures which enacted jurisdiction statutes. 00
195. See Olvera, 815 P.2d at 928-29.
196. See id. at 926.
197. See supra notes 118, 179 and accompanying text.
198. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 550 (1987).
199. See supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
200. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 71.
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However, the changing dynamics of the American family20 . have
generated a growing number of opportunities for stepparents and
stepchildren to develop meaningful and lasting emotional relationships
with each other.2" 2 Denial of standing to these stepparents, in essence,
fails to acknowledge the reality of that premise.2 3 Absent legislative
action, it is in the hands of the courts to interpret custody jurisdiction
statutes in a way that protects both the stepparent and the stepchild who
have established close emotional bonds. The in loco parentis doctrine
provides courts with the means to do so.
Stepparents found to be in loco parentis with their stepchildren
should have the right to petition the court for custody within a dissolution proceeding. As established above, a finding of in loco parentis
allows courts to treat stepparents as if they were the biological or legal
parents by conferring parental rights and obligations on them.2" If
stepparents hold themselves out like parents20 5 toward a stepchild, a
court should treat them as such by granting them the opportunity to sue
for custody if they so choose. Thereafter, for stepparents to win custody,
they must successfully overcome whatever substantive standard the court
applies in third-party custody disputes.20 6
Using the in loco parentisdoctrine to confer standing on stepparents
solves the problems caused by the denial of standing to all stepparents
in dissolution proceedings.2 7 First, it gives courts the opportunity to
confront issues dealing with the custodial biological or legal parent's
fitness, should any arise in a custody hearing. Second, it does not allow
courts to create an absolute preference for the custodial biological or
legal parent since an in loco parentis stepparent would have the
opportunity to present his or her case. Third, this jurisdiction standard
would serve the child's best interest; the paramount interest in any
custody proceeding.2 8 This rule recognizes that there are circumstances

201.

See CENSUS, supranote 2.

202. See. e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Hickenbottom
v. Hickenbottom, 477 NAV.2d 8 (Neb. 1991); Ray v. Ray, No. 89-B-4, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4696
(Dec. 14, 1989); Drawbaugh v. Drawbaugh, 647 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); In re Marriage of
Allen, 626 P.2d 16 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981); see also supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
203. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 71.
204. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d at 16-17.
206. See supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
207. See supra Part IV.C.

208. See, e.g., Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611, 613 (Idaho 1989) ("The paramount
consideration in any dispute involving the custody and care of a minor child is the child's best

interests."); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982) ("In a controversy over custody,
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where the best interest of the child may dictate a custody award to the
stepparent, despite the custodial rights of the biological or legal
parent. 0 9 One court noted:
The day is long past... when the right of a parent to the custody of
his or her child, where the extraordinary circumstances are present,
would be enforced inexorably, contrary to the best interest of the child,
on the theory solely of an absolute legal right. Instead, in the extraordinary circumstance, when there is a conflict, the best interest of the child
has always
been regarded as superior to the right of parental custo2 10
dy.

Denial of standing does not allow a court to even reach the question of
what is in the best interest of a stepchild. Finally, this standard promotes
judicial economy. Where the custodial biological or legal parent's skills
fall below legal standards for retaining custody, an in loco parentis
stepparent would not need to commence a separate proceeding in another
court. The divorce court would deal with the custody issue in the
dissolution proceeding. At the same time, this rule does not open the
floodgates to custody litigation.2 ' Stepparents who are determined not
to be in loco parentiswith their stepchild would still be unable to make
2 12
substantive arguments for custody.
Conceivably, in loco parentis stepparents could use their ability to
sue for custody as a coercive tool in the hopes of extracting concessions
from their spouses in other areas relating to the divorce.213 Yet, this
threat is not convincing enough to force courts to block the efforts of
every stepparent from achieving standing. Despite its moral implications,
using the threat of custody litigation as a coercive tool toward reaching

the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child .....
209. See Paquette v. Paquette, 499 A.2d 23, 28 (Vt. 1985).
210. Id. at 28 (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 1976)).
211. It is important to note that this standard is meant only to apply in divorce proceedings
where dissolution jurisdiction statutes need to be interpreted. In cases where other parties not
involved in the marriage want custody, different proceedings must be commenced which are
governed by separate statutes and where jurisdictional requirements may be different than those of
dissolution proceedings. See supra notes 118, 179 and accompanying text. Therefore, there is no
reason to believe that courts would apply this jurisdictional standard when other persons not a party
to the marriage, such as aunts, uncles, or grandparents, seek custody of the children.
212. One court held that any stepparent has standing to sue for custody of his or her

stepchildren in a dissolution proceeding. See Stamps v. Rawlins, 761 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Ark. 1988).
The court did so despite the governing statute which stated that the court only had custody
jurisdiction in divorce proceedings over "children of the marriage." See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101
(Michie 1993).
213. See Scott Altman, Lurking in the Shadow, 68 S.CAL. L. REV. 493, 494-510 (1995).
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a more favorable resolution is legal and has been used for years by
biological or legal parents while in the process of dissolving their
marriage.14 From a legal standpoint, coercion should not be looked at
any differently when dealing with an in loco parentisstepparent since his
or her status allows courts to impose obligations and duties on them
normally reserved for biological or legal parents. The threat of coercion
in divorce cases involving an in loco parentis stepparent is no greater
than in divorce cases involving biological or legal parents." 5 Until
lawmakers propose better solutions, the coercion dilemma will remain a
constant problem in all divorce proceedings. 1 6
As noted above,217 the issue of stepparent standing typically arises
when the jurisdiction statute is one derived from UMDA § 401, or is a
"children of the marriage" statute. Since each has its own jurisdictional
requirements, the in loco parentis stepparent standing rule has to be
applied in different ways to fit within the framework of each statute.
A.

Using the In Loco Parentis Doctrine to Confer Standing
Under UMDA Statutes

Presently, in most UMDA jurisdictions, the only way a stepparent
is certain to get standing to petition for custody within a dissolution
proceeding is when the stepchild is not in the physical custody of one of
his biological or legal parents. 18 Therefore, stepparents who have
established meaningful and lasting bonds with their stepchildren may
have no recourse if one of the biological or legal parents has physical
custody when the stepparent files the custody petition.1 9 To resolve
this problem, this Note suggests that an in loco parentis stepparent
should be treated as a "parent" for the purposes of UMDA-derived
custody jurisdiction statutes. To date, Washington, in In re Marriageof
Allen, 20 is the only state that has adopted this approach. In Allen, the

214. See id.
215. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Holcomb, 471 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); Gribble
v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978).
216. See Altman, supra note 213, at 527-29 (asserting that settlement agreements in divorce
proceedings should be submitted to courts one stage at a time in order to avoid potential coercive

activity).
217. See supra Part IV.A-B.
218. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-331(B)(2) (vest 1991); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/601(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.420(4)(b) (Michie 1984); MONT. CODE

ANN. § 40-4-211(4)(b) (1995).
219. See, e.g., Olvera v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
220. 626 P.2d 16 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
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stepmother filed for divorce from the custodial biological father and
petitioned the court for custody of her deaf stepson. She tried to adopt
the child in the past but was unsuccessful due to the objection of the
biological mother. During the four-year marriage, the stepmother greatly
assisted her handicapped stepson in his intellectual and social development, while the biological father's attitude was described as "apathetic
and fatalistic."2' 2 Finding the father unsuitable, the trial court held that
the stepmother had standing to bring the custody petition, and awarded
custody to her as well.m On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals
affirmed the grant of standing to the stepmother but on an alternate
ground. The court held that stepparents can be defined as a "parent"
under the state's custody jurisdiction statute'n when they are found to
stand in loco parentis in a matter of child custody. 224 After examining
the facts, the court found the stepmother stood in loco parentis with her
stepson and granted her standing to sue for custody within the dissolution
225
proceeding as a parent as opposed to a nonparent.
In loco parentis has been used to expand the meaning of "parent"
in other contexts outside of UMDA legislation. In In re Custody of
D.MM ,226 the Wisconsin Supreme Court used the in loco parentis
doctrine to confer visitation rights on a great-aunt who had guardianship
of her grandniece for the previous six years. A governing statute
provided that "' [a] parent is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless
the court finds ... that visitation would endanger the child's physical,
mental or emotional health."'" 7 The court held that absent a statutory
definition, they were bound to define "parent" as it was commonly and
ordinarily understood. After referring to a standard dictionary definition,

221. Id. at 19.
222. See id. at 20. Washington's UMDA jurisdictional statute gives standing to stepparents when
"the child is not in the physical custody of one of its parents or if the petitioner alleges that neither
parent is a suitable custodian." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.180(l)(b) (West 1984) (repealed

1987). This statute is now codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.030 (West Supp. 1996).
223. See Allen, 626 P.2d at 21 (finding stepparent to be a "parent" under WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.180(1)(a) (repealed 1987)). This statute was renumbered as WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.10.030(l) (West 1994).
224. See Allen, 626 P.2d at 21. One commentator argues that courts should not stop at defining

in loco parentis stepparents as "parents" for the purposes of jurisdiction but should allow such
stepparents to bypass the parental rights standard as well. This would allow courts to apply a straight
best interest standard in these cases. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthoodto Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 505-06 (1990).
225. See Allen, 626 P.2d at 21.
226. 404 N.W.2d 530 (Wis. 1987).
227. Id. at 534 (quoting Vis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (repealed 1988) (emphasis added)).
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the court held that a parent can be defined as "'a person standing in loco
parentis although not a natural parent.' '22 8 Although the aunt was
granted visitation rights on other grounds, 2 9 it is significant that the
court was willing to acknowledge that a person standing in loco parentis
23
can come within the accepted definition of parent. 1
The Idaho Supreme Court in Stockwell v. Stockwell2 3t followed a
similar chain of reasoning. There, the court held that the stepfather did
have to overcome the parental preference standard in his suit for custody
of his stepdaughter. The court was free to decide the custody issue solely
on the child's best interest since he had already established a "substantial
custodial and parental relationship" with the child. 32 In essence, the

court treated him as a "parent" by not subjecting him to the parental
preference standard, a substantive custody standard typically applied

where a stepparent or other third-party brings suit for custody of the
child in question.233
Defining an in loco parentis stepparent as a "parent" falls within the
policies of the UMDA. The UMDA purposes and rules of construction
are as follows:
This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes, which are to: ...
(2) strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and
safeguardfamily relationships;...

(4) mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children

228. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1967)).
229. The court's holding was actually based on a detailed analysis of the visitation statute's
legislative history from which they concluded that the legislature intended to permit visitation awards
to nonparents when it was in the child's best interest. See In re Custody of D.M.M., 404 N.W.2d
at 536-37. Appearing to agree with this analysis, the Wisconsin legislature amended this statute to

include the following language:
[Upon petition by a... stepparent... who has maintained a relationship similar to a
parent-child relationship with the child, the court may grant reasonable visitation rights
to that person if the parents have notice of the hearing and if the court determines that
visitation is in the best interest of the child.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (west Supp. 1996).
230. For a similar conclusion, see Gribblev. Gribble,583 P.2d 64,68 (Utah 1978) (holding that
an in loco parentisstepparent can be defined as a "parent" for the purposes of construing a visitation
statute).
231. 775 P.2d 611 (Idaho 1989).
232. Id. at 614.
233. See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
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caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage; .... 234
Granting standing to stepparents in loco parentis with their
stepchildren gives stepparents the opportunity to maintain deep, strong,
emotional, and meaningful bonds with their stepchildren which developed
while the stepfamily was intact. These bonds might otherwise be lost if
stepparents are denied the opportunity to even be heard in court.
Therefore, broadening the definition of "parent" certainly serves the
UMDA goal of "safeguard[ing] family relationships. 235 In addition,
this rule mitigates the harm to stepchildren involved in a divorce since
it provides in loco parentis stepparents with a mechanism that may allow
them the opportunity to remain a significant part of a stepchild's life.
The Prefatory Note to the UMDA states that "[t]he custody and
support provisions of the Act emphasize the interest of children rather
than the wishes of their parents. 236 The use of in loco parentis to
expand the definition of "parent" by the courts in Allen and D.M.M. is
a recognition that the function of a parent does not necessarily have to
be fulfilled by the biological or legal parent themselves. When a
stepparent assumes a parental role in the stepchild's life, the child's best
interest may dictate that the relationship continue after termination of the
marriage. Absent legislative changes, the in loco parentisdoctrine is the
best available option for courts to protect the child's best interests and
the stepparent's interest as well.
B.

Using the In Loco Parentis Doctrine to Confer Standing Under
"Children of the Marriage" Statutes

A strict interpretation of a "children of the marriage" statute does
not allow courts to invoke their custody jurisdiction over stepchildren in
dissolution proceedings.237 To protect relationships between stepparents

234. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 102, 9A U.L.A. 158 (1987) (emphasis added).
235. Id. § 102(2).
236. Id., Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 149.
237. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goetz and Lewis, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32 (Ct. App. 1988);
Morrow v. Morrow, 345 A.2d 561, 563 (Conn. 1974); State ex rel. McCarroll v. Marion County
Superior Court, 515 N.E.2d 1124, 1125 (Ind. 1987); Phillips v. Phillips, 156 P.2d 199, 203 (Or.
1945); see also In re Marriage of Hinman, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245, 247-48 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that, although in most cases the court had no jurisdiction over the stepchildren, here the mother
invoked the court's jurisdiction by listing the children as "children of the marriage" on her divorce
petition); Hartshome v. Hartshome, 185 N.E.2d 329, 330-31 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959) (holding that the
court normally would not have jurisdiction to make custody decrees in dissolution proceedings over
stepchildren, but they could not reverse the lower court's grant of standing to the stepparent due to
a procedural technicality in the mother's appeal).
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and stepchildren who have formed lasting emotional bonds, this Note
suggests that once a court finds that a stepparent is in loco parentis with
their stepchild, the stepchild becomes a "child of the marriage" for the
purposes of the jurisdiction statute. To date, only three jurisdictions have
adopted this approach. The first was Kansas in State v. Taylor.38 The
Kansas Supreme Court found it had jurisdiction over the stepchild,
despite a statute which allowed courts to make custody provisions in
divorce proceedings for "'minor children of the marriage.' ' 239 The
court based its holding on the finding that the stepmother stood in loco
parentis with the child. 40 She had received the child into her home and
assumed responsibility for its care during the marriage. In the court's
mind, "the expression... 'minor children of the marriage,' fairly
interpreted, included the infant in question ... ."24 The court in
Anderson v. Anderson242 affirmed the ruling which held that the eleven
year-old stepchild was a "'minor child[] of the marriage' for purposes
of custody jurisdiction since the stepmother stood in loco parentiswith
her for the entire marriage.24 3
Alaska followed the reasoning of Taylor and Anderson in Carter v.
Brodrick.244 In Carter, the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted its
jurisdiction statute24 ' to define a stepchild as a "child of the marriage"
24 6
where the stepparent had assumed the status of in loco parentis.
Although the stepfather only requested visitation, the court clearly
extended its reasoning to include stepparent custody as well. The court
noted, "relationships that affect the child which are based upon psychological rather than biological parentage may be important enough to
protect through custody ... to ensure that the child's best interests are
'
being served."247

238. 264 P. 1069 (Kan. 1928).

239. Id. at 1070.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. 379 P.2d 348 (Kan. 1963).

243. Id. at 350-51.
244. 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982).
245. Id. at 852 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.205 (renumbered as ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150

(Michie 1995))).
246. See id. at 855.
247. Id. The court also held that "where a stepparent has assumed the status of in loco parentis,
a stepchild is a 'child of the marriage' within AS 09.55.205" thus providing additional evidence that
the court meant for their holding to apply to custody cases as well. Id. (now codified at ALASKA
STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 1995)) (emphasis added). The statute allowed, and still allows, courts to

make custody and visitation orders for any "child of the marriage." ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150.
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A Vermont court also used the in loco parentis doctrine to grant
248 In Paquette, the stepfastepparent standing in Paquette v. Paquette.
ther petitioned the court for custody of his twelve year-old stepson upon
filing for divorce from the mother. Faced with a "children of the
marriage" statute,24 9 the court cited to Taylor and Carter as support for
holding that stepchildren found to be in an in loco parentisrelationship
with their stepparent are "'child[ren] of the marriage' for the purposes
of the jurisdiction statute.250 The court justified its holding by noting
that the rights and liabilities arising out of the in loco parentis relationship are exactly the same as parent and child. Therefore, it was
appropriate for them to define in loco parentis stepchildren as "children
of the marriage. 2 5'
The standing requirements and interpretations of the UMDA and
"children of the marriage" statutes are indicative of courts' and
legislatures' continuous attachment to the traditional derivative theory
once thought to govern the steprelationship. This stubborn, idealistic
thought process continues, despite the growing opportunities for
stepparents and stepchildren to develop mutual, long-lasting, emotional
bonds, bonds which may be even stronger than those the child has with
his or her biological or legal parent.252 The Arizona Court of Appeals,
in the stepparent visitation case of Bryan v. Bryan,253 recognized this
possibility:
The ties that cement the members of a family into a unit of
solidarity is (sic) not necessarily the result of blood relation, but they
arise out of and are formed by an intimate association sharing with
each other the joys and sorrows, the fears and hopes, the successes and
failures of each and all. There is a deep seated desire in the breast of
every person, whether child or adult, to have some one care about their
welfare to whom they may anchor and find peace .and contentment in
the knowledge that they do care.2- 4
To this point, our legal system's response to the modem realities of
the American family as described above in Bryan can only be classified

248. 499 A.2d 23 (Vt. 1985).
249. Id. at 26 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN.

§ 652(a)

(repealed 1985) (now codified at VT. STAT.

ANN. tit. 15, §665 (1990))).
250. Paquette,499 A.2d at 26; see also id. at 26-30.

251. Id. at 27.
252. See Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottorn, 477 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 1991); see also supra note 5.
253. 645 P.2d 1267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
254. Id. at 1272 (quoting Clifford v. Woodford, 320 P.2d 452, 457 (Ariz. 1957)).
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as inadequate. The growing prevalence of the stepfamily in our country's
way of life only magnifies this inadequate response by our legal system.
Acceptance of the in loco parentis doctrine for custody battles within
stepparent dissolution proceedings would be one step in the right
direction. The doctrine's adoption would give courts the freedom to
break away from archaic notions about the stepfamily and allow them to
reach a responsible conclusion as to where the child in question is best
suited to live and who is most qualified to raise them.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The realities of the modem family necessitate new attitudes on the
part of legislatures and courts toward the stepfamily. Yet, despite the
continual growth of stepfamily relationships in this country,"' lawmakers have failed to provide clear and concise rules to define and protect
the rights and obligations of the parties to the steprelationship.25 6
Clearly, many courts and legislatures continue to cling to the theory that
the stepparent-child relationship is derivative of the marriage between the
stepparent and the biological or legal parent, with any rights
and
27
obligations thereof terminating upon the end of the marriage.
A court's refusal to grant standing to stepparents to sue for custody
in dissolution proceedings amounts to a denial of the significance of the
relationship to further protect the custodial rights of the biological or
legal parent, who may not deserve custody in the first place. In the end,
children suffer the most due to the potential dangers to which they are
subjected, such as remaining in the custody of an unfit parent.2"' In
addition, there are situations where the best interest of the child, the
paramount concern in any custody proceeding,25 9 may dictate a custody
award to a stepparent.
The in loco parentis doctrine is a device courts can use to protect
those stepparent-child relationships that have developed into substantial
parental relationships. Granting parental status in these situations "would
allow for the external recognition of a psychological state that the child
'
may have already internalized."26
Children found in loco parentis with

255. See CENSUS, supra note 2, at 5.

256.
257.
258.
259.
649 P.2d
260.

See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Hartshorne v. Hartshome, 185 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
See, e.g., Stockwell v. Stockvell, 775 P.2d 611,613 (Idaho 1989); Hutchison v. Hutchison,
38, 40 (Utah 1982).
See Boskey, supra note 59, at 827.
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their stepparent would be protected since a stepparent would now be able
to test the substantive standard applied by courts in third-party custody
disputes.2 6' At the same time, biological and legal parents would be
protected since only those stepparents that acted as "parents" to their
children would be granted standing. In addition, stepparents with standing
would still need to satisfy whatever substantive standard the court applies
to third-party custody disputes.262
Absent legislative changes in custody jurisdiction statutes, in loco
parentisis the judicial system's best option for balancing the child's best
interest against the biological or legal parent's right to custody in
stepparent custody disputes. It forces courts to look beyond their
traditional notions of what the "family" should be and to accept what the
"family" has actually become. However, acceptance of the in loco
parentisrule should not and cannot become the end of family law reform
in the area of steprelationships. Much still needs to be done in other
areas such as child support, visitation, and substantive custody law.
Lawmakers must recognize the importance of and protect steprelationships considering that the stepfamily has become an accepted part of our
society's way of life.
Bryce Levine

261. See supra Part V.
262. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 75-78.
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